There
is no simple rule-of-thumb to determine when recessions begin or
end. Recessions are officially declared by the National Bureau
of Economic Research (NBER), a non-profit research organization.
The NBER defines a recession as a "significant decline in
economic activity spread across the economy, lasting more than a
few months" based on a number of economic indicators, with an
emphasis on trends in employment and income.
According to the NBER, the U.S. economy entered a recession in
December 2007, making it the longest recession of the post-World
War II era. One unique characteristic of this recession was the
severe disruption to financial markets. Financial conditions
began to deteriorate in August 2007, but became more severe in
September 2008. While financial downturns commonly accompany
economic downturns, financial markets functioned smoothly in
previous recessions.
1.
"U.S. Economy in Recession: Similarities To and Differences
From the Past," CRS Report for Congress R40198, February 5,
2009
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
- Introduction
- The Length and Depth of Recessions
- Unemployment in Recessions
- Consumption and Investment in Recessions
- Recessions and Oil Prices
- Recessions and the World Economy
- Recessions and the Financial Sector
- Comparisons Between the Current Recession and the
Great Depression
- Figure 1. Cumulative Change in the Unemployment Rate
Following Onset of Post-War Recessions
- Table 1. Economic Indicators During Post-War
Recessions
2. "Containing Financial Crisis," CRS Report for
Congress RL34412, November 24, 2008. . . . . . 13
- Introduction
- The Underlying Financial Problems
- Complex Finance: The House of Cards
- SIVs
- Metro's Credit Enhancement
- What Makes a Financial Crisis?
- Government Interventions
- Open Market Operations and Monetary Policy
- The Discount Window
- Term Auction Facility (TAF)
- Treasury's "Super-SIV" Proposal
- Provision of New Capital to Financial Institutions
- Bear Stearns
- Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
- AIG
- The $700 Billion Troubled Assets Relief Program (P.L.
110-343)
- Increases in Government Guarantees and Insurance
- Commercial Paper
- Citigroup
- Policy Issues: Are Regulators' Tools Adequate?
- Information
- Speculation
- Figure 1. Bank Stock Indices and the S&P 500, Jan
2007-October 2008
- Figure 2. Developed Country Bank Stock Indices, Jan.
2007-Oct. 2008
- Figure 3. Bank and Financial Stock Indices, Selected
Countries, Jan. 2007-Oct. 2008
- Figure 4. Structured Investment Vehicle Cash Flows
- Figure 5. The Leverage Cycle
-Table 1. Debt Growth by Sector, 2007-2008
3. "Insolvency of Systemically Significant Companies:
Bankruptcy vs. Conservatorship/Receivership," CRS Report for
Congress R40530, April 20, 2009 . . . . . . 39
- Introduction
- Comparison of Depository Institutions and Systemically
Significant Financial Institutions
- Differences Between the FDIC's
Conservatorship/Receivership Powers and the Bankruptcy
Code
- Overall Objectives of Each Regime
- Insolvency Initiation Authority and Timing
- Oversight Structure and Appeal
- Management, Shareholder, and Creditor Rights
- FDIC "Superpowers," Including Contract Repudiation,
Versus Bankruptcy's Automatic Stay
- Speed of Resolution
4.
"Financial Market Turmoil and U.S. Macroeconomic
Performance," CRS Report for Congress R40007, December 3,
2008 . . . . . . 55
- Introduction
- Evidence of Tighter Credit Conditions
- The Effect of Tighter Credit Conditions on
Macroeconomic Activity
- Impact of Tight Credit on Residential Investment
- Impact of Tight Credit on Business Investment
- Impact of Tight Credit on Consumer Spending
- The Effect on Consumer Spending of Falling Asset
Values Reducing Household Wealth
- The Double- Edged Influence of the International
Sector on GDP
- International Flows of Goods
- International Flows of Capital (Assets)
- An Estimate of the Potential Drag on Real GDP Growth
from a Diminished Flow of Credit
- A Simulation of the Effect of a Diminished Credit Flow
on Real GDP
- Economic Policy Responses to the Credit Crisis
- Conventional Macroeconomic Policy
- Monetary Policy
- Fiscal Policy
- The Fed as "Lender of Last Resort"
- Extraordinary Measures (Large Scale Intervention)
- How Will TARP Work?
- Will TARP Solve the Problem?
- Forecasting the U.S. Economy's Path Through the
Financial Crisis
5.
"Financial Turmoil: Comparing the TARP to the Federal
Reserve's Response," CRS Report for Congress RS22966,
October 8, 2008 . . . . . . 79
6."The Cost of Government Financial Interventions,
Past and Present," CRS Report for Congress RS22956, January
30, 2009 . . . . . . . 85
- Introduction
- Where Has the Money Come From?
- The Cost of Financial Interventions
- Recent Financial Interventions
- Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP)
- TARP Capital Purchase Program
- Bank of America
- U.S. Automakers
- Citigroup
- American International Group (AIG)
- Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
- Bear Stearns
- Table 1. Summary of Current and Historical Financial
Interventions by the Federal Government
7."Financial Market Intervention," CRS Report for
Congress RS22963, January 29, 2009 . . . . . . 97
- Current Concerns
- What, if anything, is wrong with the financial system?
- When did trouble in the financial markets start?
- What caused financial market turmoil?
- If 97% of mortgage borrowers are not in foreclosure,
why is the financial turmoil so large?
- Where are the problem loans located?
- Who is affected by the financial turmoil?
- How have policymakers responded to financial turmoil?
- Why have the Federal Reserve's traditional tools not
restored order in financial markets?
- What is contained in EESA, P.L. 110- 343?
- What has Treasury done under the EESA?
- What legislation is being considered in the 111th
Congress?
- What is a Bad Bank?
8. "Troubled Asset Relief Program: Legislation and
Treasury Implementation," CRS Report for Congress RL34730,
March 24, 2009 . . . . . . . 107
- Introduction
- The Troubled Assets Relief Program
- Executive and Congressional Proposals
- Provisions of TARP as Enacted
- Asset Purchase Program
- Asset Insurance Program
- Size of the Programs
- Private Equity and Debt Considerations
- Oversight Provisions
- Assistance to Homeowners
- Executive Compensation
- Mark- to- Market Accounting
- Increase in Deposit Insurance
- Assistance to Financial Institutions Holding Fannie
Mae/Freddie Mac Preferred Stock
- Duration of Program
- Treasury Implementation of TARP
- Asset Purchase Mechanism
- Asset Insurance
- Capital Purchase Program
- Systemically Significant Failing Institutions Program
(AIG)
- Targeted Investment Program (Citigroup and Bank of
America)
- Consumer Lending Facility
- U.S. Automobile Manufacturers
- Homeowners' Assistance
- Public Private Partnership Investment Program (PPPIP)
- 111th Congress
- TARP Reform and Accountability Act of 2009 (H.R. 384)
- Participating Institutions Reporting Use of Funds
- Mergers and Acquisitions
- Voluntary Withdrawal from TARP
- Executive Compensation
- New Lending
- Warrants and other Taxpayer Protections
- Smaller Institutions
- Oversight
- TARP Foreclosure Mitigation Plan
- Auto Industry Provisions
- Clarification of Troubled Assets (Consumer Loans,
Municipal Securities, Commercial Real Estate)
- Changes to Hope for Homeowners Program
- Home Buyer Stimulus and GSE Securities Program
- FDIC Provisions
- Additional Amendments to H.R. 384
- Potential Causes of Financial Instability
- Confidence and the Credit Cycle
- Information Asymmetries
- Moral Hazard
- Network Externalities
- Collective Action
- Sources of Recent Market Turmoil
- Expectations, Mortgage Defaults, and Asset Prices
- Liquidity and Uncertainty
- Capital Adequacy and Leverage
- Too Complex to Fail?
- Evidence of the Real Effects of Financial Market
Turmoil
- Wealth Effect?
- Bank Balance Sheets and Tightening Credit Markets
- Reinforcing Delinquencies and Foreclosures in Housing
Markets
- Difficulties of Using Debt Financing to Fund Purchases
- Conclusion
- Figure 1. Index of ARM Foreclosure Rates, 2001=100
Prime ARMs Have Unexpectedly High Foreclosure Rates
- Figure 2. Index of FRM Foreclosure Rates, 2001=100
Fixed-Rate Subprime Loans Have Unexpectedly Low
Foreclosure Rates
- Figure 3. Spread Between Commercial Paper and
One-Month Treasuries
- Appendix. Glossary of Terms Related to Disruption of
Financial Markets
9."U.S. Motor Vehicle Industry: Federal Financial
Assistance and Restructuring," CRS Report for Congress
R40003, May 29, 2009 . . . . . . 145
- Introduction
- The Detroit 3 in Crisis
- Organization of This Report
- Auto Industry Loan Developments: Late 2008-Early 2009
- Auto Industry Restructuring Plans in December 2008
- Congressional Action in December 2008
- Federal Action to Aid the Auto Industry
- Impact on the National Economy
- National Impact of Detroit 3 Failure
- Impact Focused on "Auto Alley"
- The Domestic Motor Vehicle Market
- Loss of Detroit 3 Market Share
- Falling Demand Affects All Automakers in the United
States and Abroad
- Labor Negotiations in 2007 to Address Competitive
Issues
- The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007
(EISA)
- Legislative Efforts to Assist Automakers in November
2008
- Assistance to Auto Industry in the 2009 Stimulus
Package
- Employment in the Automotive Sector
- Financial Issues in the Auto Industry
- Credit Conditions
- Bush Administration's Financial Plan to Assist
Automakers
- Financial Solutions: Bridge Loans and Restructuring
- Federal Bridge Loans
- Bankruptcy Procedures in Case Restructuring Fails
- Pension and Health Care Issues
- Pensions and Pension Insurance
- Health Care Issues
- Stipulations and Conditions on TARP Loans to the Auto
Industry
- Executive Privileges and Compensation
- Other Restructuring Plan Conditions
- Key CRS Policy Staff and Areas of Expertise
- Figure 1. U.S. Motor Vehicle Sales
- Table 1. Summary of Direct Federal Assistance For
General Motors and Chrysler
- Table 2. Reorganization of "New" Chrysler
- Table 3. Market Shares of U.S. Car and Truck Sales
- Table 4. U.S. Automotive Employment
- Table 5. Funded Status of General Motors and Ford
Pension Plans for U.S. Employees, Year-end 2007
- Table 6. Contact Information for Key CRS Policy Staff
10."Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Act of 1979:
Background, Provisions, and Cost" . . . . . . 229
- Background
- Arguments For and Against the Guarantee
- Major Provisions of the Loan Guarantee Act
- Results of Loan Guarantee
- "Voluntary" Export Restraints
- Budgetary Cost of Guarantee
- Current Budgetary Cost of Federal Credit
- Conclusions
- Author Contact Information
11. "Federal Financial Assistance: Preliminary
Observations on Assistance Provided to AIG," GAO Testimony
Before the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and
Government Sponsored Enterprises, House Committee on
Financial Services, Statement of Orice M. Williams . . .
. . . 241
- Why GAO Did This Study - What GAO Found -
Summary - Table 1: Amounts of AIG Federal Assistance
Used and Authorized as of March 2, 2009 - Background
- AIG's Financial Problems Mounted Quickly - Overview
of Federal Assistance Provided - Table 2: Use of
Federal Funds and Borrowings Outstanding from the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Revolving Credit
Facility as of February 18, 2009 - Federal Efforts
Have Focused on Maintaining and Monitoring AIG's
Solvency, but AIG Faces Challenges in Repaying Federal
Assistance - Federal and State Monitoring Efforts Are
Focused on AIG Solvency - AIG Faces a Number of
Challenges to Its Ability to Repay Its Federal Funds
- Some of AIG's Competitors Claim that AIG's Commercial
Insurance Pricing Is Out of Line With Its Risks but
Other Insurance Industry Participants and Observers
Disagree - Contact and Acknowledgements - Appendix
I: Timeline of AIG Financial Difficulties Leading Up to
Federal Assistance
12. "Auto Industry: Summary of Government Efforts and
Automakers' Restructuring to Date," GAO Report to Congress
. . . . . 265
- Letter
- Scope and Methodology
- Background
- Treasury Has Established Programs to Help Stabilize
the Auto Industry
- In Providing Assistance to the Auto Industry, Treasury
Identified Goals and Objectives for the Assistance and
Took Steps to Protect the Government's Interest
- Automakers Have Addressed Some of the Factors
Important for Achieving Viability, and Many Challenges
Remain
- Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
- Appendix I Members of GAO's Auto Industry Panel
- Appendix II GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements
- Table 1: GAO's Principles for Government Assistance as
Applied to the Auto Industry Financing Program
- Table 2: Components and Funding Levels under the
Automotive Industry Financing Program
- Table 3: Loan Terms and Conditions Designed to Manage
Risk and Protect the Government's Interest
- Table 4: Individuals with Auto Industry Expertise
Identified by NAS Who Were Interviewed
- Figure 1: Key Financial Relationships in the Auto
Industry
- Figure 2: Monthly Light Vehicle Sales, 1976 to 2009
(Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate)
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